Preferential trade agreements and antidumping actions against members and nonmembers by Mukunoki Hiroshi
Preferential trade agreements and antidumping
actions against members and nonmembers
著者 Mukunoki Hiroshi
権利 Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア
経済研究所 / Institute of Developing
Economies, Japan External Trade Organization
(IDE-JETRO) http://www.ide.go.jp
journal or
publication title
IDE Discussion Paper
volume 611
year 2016-07-01
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2344/1574
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 
  
IDE Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated  
to stimulate discussions and critical comments 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: preferential trade liberalization, antidumping, international oligopoly 
JEL classification: F12, F13, F15, L13 
  
* Faculty of Economics, Gakushuin University, Mejiro 1-5-1, Toshima, Tokyo 
171-8588, Japan; E-mail: hiroshi.mukunoki@gakushuin.ac.jp 
IDE DISCUSSION PAPER No. 611 
Preferential trade agreements and 
antidumping actions against members 
and nonmembers 
 
Hiroshi Mukunoki* 
 
July 2016 
Abstract  
In a three-country oligopoly model, this paper analyzes a country’s decisions 
concerning antidumping (AD) action against two foreign countries and the 
relationship between those decisions and regional trade agreements (RTAs). An RTA 
intensifies product-market competition in the markets of member countries and 
lowers product prices, while it raises export prices of goods subject to tariff 
reductions. This effect widens the dumping margin of the non-member firm and 
narrows the dumping margin of the member firm. If the government is more 
concerned with domestic firm profit in its AD decision, the RTA may invoke the 
member’s AD action against the nonmember. If the governments attach a sufficiently 
high value on social welfare, however, the RTA may promote the AD action against 
the member. If the governments’ weight on the domestic firm’s profit is neither high 
nor low, an RTA may block the AD actions against both countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) is a semigovernmental, 
nonpartisan, nonprofit research institute, founded in 1958. The Institute 
merged with the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) on July 1, 1998.  
The Institute conducts basic and comprehensive studies on economic and 
related affairs in all developing countries and regions, including Asia, the 
Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Oceania, and Eastern Europe. 
 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).  Publication does 
not imply endorsement by the Institute of Developing Economies of any of the views 
expressed within. 
 
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (IDE), JETRO 
3-2-2, WAKABA, MIHAMA-KU, CHIBA-SHI 
CHIBA 261-8545, JAPAN 
 
©2016 by Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO 
No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the 
IDE-JETRO. 
Preferential trade agreements and antidumping
actions against members and nonmembers∗
Hiroshi Mukunoki†
Gakushuin University
March 8, 2016
Abstract
In a three-country oligopoly model, this paper analyzes a country’s decisions
concerning antidumping (AD) action against two foreign countries and the rela-
tionship between those decisions and regional trade agreements (RTAs). An RTA
intensifies product-market competition in the markets of member countries and
lowers product prices, while it raises export prices of goods subject to tariff reduc-
tions. This effect widens the dumping margin of the non-member firm and narrows
the dumping margin of the member firm. If the government is more concerned
with domestic firm profit in its AD decision, the RTA may invoke the member’s
AD action against the nonmember. If the governments attach a sufficiently high
value on social welfare, however, the RTA may promote the AD action against the
member. If the governments’ weight on the domestic firm’s profit is neither high
nor low, an RTA may block the AD actions against both countries.
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1 Introduction
Recently, the world economy has witnessed a rapid growth in regional trade agreements
(RTAs). RTAs include trade agreements for goods such as free trade agreements, customs
unions, and partial scope agreements. RTAs also include service trade agreements called
economic integration agreements. RTAs preferentially liberalize trade among member
countries. As of March 7, 2016, 424 RTAs were in force, counting trade agreements in
goods, services and accession separately.1 The number of RTAs was 28 in 1990.
Many theoretical and empirical studies address RTAs, and one strand examines the
effect of RTAs on trade polices between member and nonmember countries. With respect
to import tariffs, many theoretical papers found that member countries that eliminate
tariffs imposed on other member countries, are willing to reduce tariffs against outside
countries.2 This result is supported by some empirical studies3 and is valid even if gov-
ernments are politically motivated and concerns more with domestic producers. These
studies indicate that a proliferation of RTAs prevents protectionist trade policies and
contributes to multilateral trade liberalization. However, governments use other protec-
tionist trade policies other than simple import tariffs.
A typical example of trade-restricting policies other than tariffs is antidumping (AD)
policy. Under the rule of the World Trade Organization (WTO), countries are allowed to
impose an AD duty on an imported good by adopting an AD law. Under AD law, if the
government receives a request of AD policy from a domestic industry, it initiates an AD
investigation. Then, if the importing country’s administrator concludes that the foreign
producer is “dumping” its exported product and the dumping causes a “material injury”
to a domestic industry, the government can impose an AD duty at a level lower than
the dumping margin. In the context of international trade, dumping is identified if the
free on board (f.o.b) price of a product in the importing country is less than the “normal
value.”4 Typically, the “normal value” is the price in the exporting country market. The
dumping margin is defined as the price in the exporting country minus the f.o.b price of
1If different agreements and accessions among the same countries are counted together, 270 RTAs
were in force.
2See Bagwell and Staiger (1999) and Ornelas, (2005a,b), for instance.
3See Estevadeordal, et al. (2008), Calvo-Pardo, et al. (2011), for instance.
4The free on board price is the price excluding transportation costs and tariffs. It is the producer
price of a good that the producer recieves when exporting.
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the importing country.
Countries are frequently using AD actions to protect domestic industries. From 1995
to 2014, there were a total of 4,757 AD investigations. Among them, 2,901 actions were
actually implemented. The large number of AD actions in the world would be associated
with the recent waves of adopting AD laws. The number of countries with AD laws was
about 50 in 1990, and it exceeds 120 in 2014 (Blonigen and Prusa, 2015). Some countries
strengthen the implementation of their existing AD laws. For instance, Japan amended
its guideline for applying its AD law in 2011 to boost the domestic industries’ use of AD.5
An intriguing question is whether and how the growing number of RTAs is associated
with the frequent use of AD rules. If the formation of an RTA prevents AD actions, the
trade promoting effect of RTAs will be more pronounced. If RTA formation promotes
AD actions, the trade-creating effect of RTAs should be diminished or even reversed by
the increased use of AD rules.
Particularly, if RTAs induce countries to apply AD rules more frequently against
nonmember countries, RTAs can hurt nonmember countries even if (normal) tariffs are
reduced. For instance, Bhagwati (1993) suggests that ‘....trade creation can degenerate
rapidly into trade diversion, when AD actions ... are freely used.’ Hindley and Messerlin
(1993) also show the evidence that internal liberalization in the European Community
was accompanied by more vigorous anti-dumping action towards nonmember countries.
Prusa and Teh (2010) have estimated that RTAs cause a ten to 30 percent increase in
the number of AD filings against non-RTA members.
Despite these concerns, there are few theoretical analyses on this subject.6 This paper
examines the relationship between preferential trade liberalization in the form of an RTA
and AD policies. We extend the reciprocal dumping model of Brander and Krugman
to a three-country model. Specifically, three firms (firms 1, 2, and 3) located in each
country (countries 1, 2, and 3) supply imperfectly substitutable products to the markets
in those countries. Without AD actions and RTAs, each country imposes the same tariff
on imports from all countries. In this situation, the existence of tariffs (trade costs)
5See Japan’s Trade Remedy Laws, Regulations and Rules (http://enforcement.trade.gov/trcs/
downloads/documents/japan/index.html), accessed on October 26, 2015.
6There have been some theoretical analyses that examine the effects of AD protection in an inter-
national oligopoly model, such as Reitzes (1993), Anderson et al. (1995), Gao and Miyagiwa (2005),
Miyagiwa and Ohno (2007), and Moraga-Gonza´lez and Viaene (2015).
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induces firms to set export prices lower than their respective domestic prices, and we
observe a reciprocal dumping between countries.
To make clear the effect of an RTA, this paper focuses on country 1’s AD actions.
Country 1 may block foreign firms’ dumpings by implementing AD actions. Specifically,
if firm 1 files an AD petition against a particular foreign firm, the government of country
1 initiates an AD investigation and decides whether to accept the firm 1’s request and
impose the AD duty on the targeted firm, whose level is equal to the dumping margin.
Note that even if the targeted firm faces an AD duty, it has an option to avoid the AD
duty by setting the uniform price across the markets, and we will see that she actually
does such a “price undertaking” in equilibrium.
If a pair of countries forms an RTA, the tariff between them is reduced while the tariff
against the nonmember country remains constant. The formation of an RTA intensifies
the product-market competition in the markets of member countries and changes the
dumping margins and the effect of countries’ AD actions. This may in turn change the
government’s incentives to implement an AD action, or it affects whether the domestic
firm files an AD petition.
The result shows that the formation of an RTA that includes country 1 may either
promote or prevent country 1’s AD use against the other member and the nonmember
country, depending on the extent of the government’s political motivation to protect
the domestic firm and the administrative cost of AD investigations. Specifically, if the
government places sufficient weight on the domestic firm’s profit, and the administrative
cost is neither low nor high, the RTA may trigger a member’s AD action against the non-
member. If the government is less concerned with the domestic firm and more concerned
with social welfare, the RTA may block the member’s AD action that would have applied
had the RTA been absent.
Conversely, the RTA may block the member’s use of AD against the other member
if the government weight on the domestic profit is high, whereas the RTA may promote
the member’s use of AD action if the government sufficiently values social welfare. If
country 1 becomes the nonmember of an RTA, it will discourage its AD actions if the
government’s weight on the producer’s profit is high while the RTA may promote AD
actions if it is low.
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These results indicate that there is no clear-cut relationship between preferential trade
liberalization and AD. If the government cares more about the producer’s profit, an RTA
will promote ADs against nonmembers and discourage ADs against members. If the
government care less about social welfare but it is still not a social-welfare maximizer, an
RTA may prevent ADs against nonmembers and instead promote ADs against members.
There is also a case where an RTA blocks ADs against all firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model.
Section 3 derives the equilibrium of the product-market competition given the country
1’s AD decisions. Section 4 analyzes the determination of countries’ AD actions and
explores the effect of preferential trade liberalization. Section 5 summarizes the paper
and presents concluding remarks.
2 The model
The model includes three countries, and Ω = {1, 2, 3} is a set of countries. Country i has
a single firm, firm i, that produces a differentiated product and sells that product in all
three countries. Let tij (≥ 0) denote the import tariff imposed by country i (i ∈ Ω) on
imports from country j (j ∈ Ω). For expositional convenience, we set tij = 0 if i = j.
We focus on AD actions of country 1, which may implement AD action against either
country 2 or country 3, or both. If firm 1 requests an AD action towards country k
(k = 2, 3), it incurs a fixed application cost per request, which is denoted by F . If firm
1 requests AD actions against both foreign countries, it must incur 2F . The fixed cost
includes the cost of documenting and reporting the damages caused by the targeted firm’s
dumping.
The direct utility function of the representative consumer in country i is given by
Ui =
∑
j∈Ω
(
axij − (xij)
2
2
− bxij
∑
h6=j
xih
)
+ Yi (1)
where xij is the consumption of product j (j ∈ Ω) and Yi is the consumption of the nu-
meraire good in country i. By maximizing Ui with respect to xij, subject to
∑
j∈Ω pijxij+
Yi ≤Mi where Mi is the income in country i, the inverse demand function of the product
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j in country i becomes
pij = a− xij − b
∑
k 6=i
xkj, (2)
where b ∈ (0, 1) represents the substitutability of products. If b = 0, the products are
non-substitutable and as b approaches one, the products become more substitutable.
Then, the demand function of good j in country i becomes
xij(pi) =
1
(1− b) (1 + 2b)
[
(1− b)a− (1 + b) pij + b
∑
k 6=j
pik
]
(3)
where p′i = (pi1, pi2, pi3) is the price vector in country i. By substituting (3) into (1), we
have the representative consumer’s indirect utility function in country i as Vi(pi,Mi).
Each firm’s unit cost of production is constant and normalized to zero. Let rij =
pij − tij denote the producer price of the good j in country i. Then, firm j’s total profits
(gross of the fixed cost of an AD application) becomes:
Πj =
∑
i
rijxij (pi) =
∑
i
(pij − tij)xij (pi) . (4)
Country i’s social welfare (gross of the fixed cost) is given by
Wi = Vi(pi,Mi)−Mi +
∑
j
tijxij (pi) + Πi. (5)
We assume each pair of countries levies the same tariff on each other’s imports. Therefore,
we have t21 = t12, t31 = t13, and t32 = t23.
If firm 1 request an AD action, the governments of country 1 chooses whether to un-
dertake an AD investigation. Government 1’s AD actions towards country 2 and country
3 are respectively given by s2 ∈ {N,AD} and s3 ∈ {N,AD} where N represents the gov-
ernment decision not to make an AD investigation, and AD represents the government
decision to undertake an AD investigation. Government 1’s payoff, gross of the fixed cost
of AD application, is given by
G1 (s2, s3) = γW1 (s2, s3) + (1− γ)Π1 (s2, s3) , (6)
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where γ is the government’s weight on social welfare relative to domestic firm’s profit.
If γ = 1, the government maximizes social welfare and, if γ = 0, the government only
concerns with the domestic firm’s profit. This government’s payoff function reflects the
fact that countries sometimes consider public interests concerns before making a decision
on the imposition of AD duty. The public interests include the interests of consumers and
industrial users of the products, who will be negatively affected by the AD measures.7 In
our model, we regard γ as the degree of the government’s consideration of public interests
in implementing AD actions.
With regard to governments’ tariffs other than AD duty, we treat them as exogenous
variables and consider three possible situations: (i) no RTA where all countries impose
MFN tariffs (t12 = t23 = t13 = τ), (ii) countries 1 and 2 form an RTA, t12 = t < t23 =
t13 = τ , where country 1 becomes a member of the RTA, (iii) countries 2 and 3 form an
RTA, t23 = t < t12 = t13 = τ , where country 1 becomes the non-member of the RTA
The timing of the game is as follows. In Stage 1, firms 1 decides whether to request
an AD investigation against each foreign firm to its domestic governments. In Stage 2,
if firm 1 requests in Stage 1, the government of country 1 decides whether to implement
requested AD actions. The government of country 1 may place substantial weight on the
domestic firm’s profits in AD decisions, which we will address later. In Stage 3, the three
firms engage in Bertrand-type competition in the markets of three countries. Under AD
action, AD duty is actually levied only if the targeted firm’s dumping is detected.
3 Product market competition and firms’ dumpings
This section derives the subgame equilibrium in Stage 3. The AD action of country 1 is
effective if and only if firm 1 requests an AD action in Stage 1 and government 1 accepts
the request and implement the AD action in Stage 2. Depending on firm 1’s decision and
the government’s decision on AD action in Stage 1 and Stage 2, there are four possible
equilibrium outcomes.
1. N: No AD actions, (s2, s3) = (N,N).
7See Kotsiubska (2011) for details.
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2. AD2: AD action against only country 2, (s2, s3) = (AD,N).
3. AD3: AD action against only country 3, (s2, s3) = (N,AD).
4. AD23: AD actions against both countries, (s2, s3) = (AD,AD).
We derive the product-market equilibrium for each case.
3.1 No AD action
Let us first derive the subgame equilibrium without AD actions (N). In this case, firms
can freely set different prices in different markets. Firm j maximizes (4) with respect to
each price. The equilibrium consumer prices of products in country i are given by
pii(N, t) =
a (1− b)
2
+
b (1 + b) (tij + tik)
4 + 6b
, (7)
pij(N, t) =
a (1− b)
2
+
(1 + b) {(2 + b) tij + btik}
4 + 6b
, and (8)
pik(N, t) =
a (1− b)
2
+
(1 + b) {(2 + b) tik + btij}
4 + 6b
, (9)
where i 6= j 6= k (i, j, k ∈ Ω) and t = (t1, t2, t3) is the tariff vector.
Accordingly, the producer prices are calculated as rii(N, t) = pii(N, t), rij(N, t) =
pij(N, t)−tij, and rNik(N, t) = pik(N, t)−tik. An important property is that the consumer
price of each good in country i is increasing while the producer price is decreasing in i’s
tariff on the good. Then, the equilibrium dumping margins of goods 2 and 3 in country
1 become
d2(N, t) = r22(N, t)− r12(N, t) = 2 (1 + 2b) t12 + b(1 + b) (t23 − t13)
2 (2 + 3b)
, (10)
d3(N, t) = r33(N, t)− r13(N, t) = 2 (1 + 2b) t13 + b(1 + b) (t23 − t12)
2 (2 + 3b)
. (11)
Without any RTA, countries must follow the most-favored-nations (MFN) principle
of WTO and levy the same tariff (i.e., the MFN tariff) on the imports from all countries.
Since countries and firms are symmetric, it is plausible to suppose three countries impose
the identical MFN tariff and t12 = t23 = t13 = τ holds. Let tN = (τ , τ , τ) denote the tariff
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vector under No RTA. In this case, d2(N, tN) = d3(N, tN) > 0 holds and the dumping
margins of goods 2 and 3 are positive in country 1.
Without loss of generality, we suppose country 2 is chosen as the partner country if
when country 1 forms an RTA. If countries 1 and 2 form an RTA, t12 = t < t23 = t13 = τ
holds. Let t12 = (t, τ , τ) denote the tariff vector under 1-2 RTA. Preferential trade
liberalization realized by an RTA increases the product market competition and thereby
decreases the equilibrium prices of the goods in countries 1 and 2. First, a decrease in
p13(N) widens the dumping margin of good 3. Second, p22(N) and p12(N) decrease but
the producer price of good 2 in country 1, p12(N) − t12, increases with a reduction of
t12. This narrows the dumping margin of good 2. Therefore, the dumping margin under
no AD action is smaller for good 2 and greater for good 3, d2(N, t12) < d2(N, tN) =
d3(N, tN) < d3(N, t12).
If countries 2 and 3 form an RTA, t23 = t < t12 = t13 = τ , where country 1 becomes an
non-member of the RTA, then the dumping margins of both imported goods decrease in
country 1 and d2(N, t23) = d3(N, t23) < d2(N, tN) = d3(N, tN) holds where t23 = (τ , τ , t).
Proposition 1 Given that countries levy the same MFN tariff without RTAs, the dump-
ing margins of goods 2 and 3 in country 1 are positive. Country 1’s RTA with country
2 decreases the dumping margin of good 2 and increases the dumping margin of good 3.
The dumping margin of good 2 is positive as long as t > 0. RTA between countries 2 and
3 decreases the dumping margin of both good 2 and good 3.
The equilibrium profit of firm j (j ∈ Ω) is given by
Πj(N, t) =
1 + b
(1− b) (1 + 2b)
∑
i
{rij(N, t)}2. (12)
3.2 AD action against one foreign country
Next, we investigate the case in which country 1 only files an AD investigation against
either firm 2 or firm 3 (AD2 or AD3).
Suppose firm 2 is a target of the AD investigation. Firm 2 anticipates that if its
dumping margin is positive (d2 = r22 − r12 = p22 − (p12 − t12) > 0), the government
of country 1 will charge the antidumping duty equal to d2. Then, firm 2 ’s optimal
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reaction is to offer a “price-undertaking” to the government of country 1, by which the
firm eliminates the dumping margin and sets a uniform price across countries 1 and 2.
This paper focuses on the case where the importing countries accept any offer of price
undertaking.
Firm 2 maximizes (4) with respect to p12 subject to p22 = p12−t12, while the other two
firms continue to discriminate prices between in countries 1 and in its own country. The
equilibrium consumer price of good j in country i is given by pij(AD2, t). The equilibrium
consumer prices of good 2 becomes
p12(AD2, t) = p12(N, t) +
1
2
d2(N, t), (13)
p22(AD2, t) = p22(N, t)− 1
2
d2(N, t), (14)
p32(AD2, t) = p32(N, t). (15)
Hence, the producer prices of good 2 are adjusted to a uniform price by increasing the
consumer price in the foreign market and decreasing the consumer price in the domestic
market. The degree of the price changes are equal to 50 percent of the dumping margin
under no AD actions.
The firm 2’s price adjustment affects other firms pricing. By comparing the equilib-
rium consumer prices of good 1 and good 3 in countries 1 and 2, we have p11(AD2, t)−
p11(N, t) = bd2(N, t)/{2(2 + b)} > 0, p13(AD2, t)− p31(N, t) = bd2(N, t)/{2(2 + b)} > 0,
p21(ADk, t) − p21(N, t) = −bd2(N, t)\{2(2 + b)} < 0, and p23(ADk, t) − p23(N, t) =
−bd2(N, t)/{2(2 + b)} < 0. Compared to the No AD action case, firm 2 increases the
price in country 1 and decreases the price in country 2. Because a firms’ pricing is
strategic complement, this increases the other firms’ equilibrium prices in country 1 and
decreases the equilibrium prices in country 2.
Under country 1’s AD action against firm 2, the dumping margin of good 3 becomes
d3(AD2, t) = d3(N, t)− b
2(2 + b)
d2(N, t) > 0. (16)
Country 1’s AD against firm 2 decreases firm 3’s dumping margin in country 1.
Similarly, if firm 3 is the target of country 1’s AD action, firm 3 increases the price of
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good 3 in country 1 and decreases it in country 3. These price changes subsequently in-
crease the prices of goods 1 and 2 in country 1 and decrease them in country 3, decreasing
firm 2’s dumping margin. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Starting from no AD action, country 1’s AD action towards one country
increases the consumer prices in all goods in country 1 and decreases those in the targeted
country. The prices in the country that is not a target of AD remain unchanged.
The equilibrium profit of each firm when only firm k (k ∈ {2.3}) is the target of AD
action is given by
Πj(ADk, t) =
1 + b
(1− b) (1 + 2b)
∑
i
{rij(ADk, t)}2 (17)
where rij(ADk, t) = pij(ADk, t)− tij.
3.3 AD actions against two foreign countries
Finally, if country 1 implements AD actions against both and countries 2 and 3 (AD23),
then both firm 2 and firm 3 set uniform prices across the two markets. Let pij(AD23, t)
denote the equilibrium consumer price of good j in country i in this case. Compared
with the case where country 1 only implement AD action against firm 2, the equilibrium
consumer prices of newly targeted firm, firm 3, are given by
p13(AD23, t) = p13(AD2, t) +
8 + 8b+ b2
(4 + 3b) (4 + b)
d3(AD2, t), (18)
p23(AD23, t) = p23(AD2, t) +
b2
(4 + 3b) (4 + b)
d3(AD2, t), (19)
p33(AD23, t) = p33(AD2, t)− 2(2 + b)
2
(4 + 3b) (4 + b)
d3(AD2, t). (20)
Firm 3 increases the price in country 1 and reduces the price in country 3. Because firm
2 has already set uniform prices between countries 1 and 2, an increase in the price of
good 3 in country 1 increases both prices of good 2 in both countries 1 and 2. This in
turn induces firm 3 to set higher price of good 3 in country 2.
Similarly, if we compare these prices with the prices when only country 3 is the target
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of country 1’s AD, all prices in countries 1 and 3 increase while those prices in country 2
decrease. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Starting from the country 1’s AD action against one country, country 1’s
AD action towards another country decreases the consumer prices of all goods in newly
targeted country and increases the consumer prices of all goods in the other two countries.
The equilibrium profit of each firm is given by
Πj(AD23, t) =
1 + b
(1− b) (1 + 2b)
∑
i
{rij(AD23, t)}2 (21)
where rij(AD23, t) = pij(AD23, t)− tij.
3.4 The effect of AD action on firms’ profits
Given no AD action is implemented, the effect of country 1’s AD action against one
foreign firm, firm k, on firm j’s operating profit (i.e., the profit gross of the fixed cost
of an AD application) is given by ∆Πj(AD
N
k , t) = Πj(ADk, t) − Πj(N, t). If country 1
implements AD actions against both foreign firms, the changes in firm j’s operating profit
is given by ∆Πj(AD
N
23, t) = Πj(AD23, t) − Πj(N, t). If ∆Π1(ADNk , t) > F holds, firm 1
benefits from the AD action against firm k. If ∆Πj(AD
N
23, t) > 2F holds, firm 1 benefits
from the AD actions against both foreign firms. Firm 1 prefers implementing two ADs
to one AD if {∆Π1(ADN23, t) − 2F} − {∆Π1(ADNk , t) − F} = ∆Π1(ADk23, t) − F > 0 is
satisfied, where ∆Πj(AD
k
23, t) = Πj(AD
N
23, t)−∆Π1(ADNk , t) is the profit change of firm
j from one AD against firm k to two ADs against both firms.
Lemma 1 When max[∆Π1(AD
N
2 , t),∆Π1(AD
N
3 , t)] = ∆Π1(AD
N
k , t) > F holds, firm 1
prefers the AD actions against both countries if ∆Π1(AD
k
23, t) > F holds and prefers the
AD action only against firm k otherwise. When max[∆Π1(AD
N
2 , t),∆Π1(AD
N
3 , t)] < F
holds, firm 1 prefers no AD actions.
We can confirm that, as long as the dumping margin of the targeted foreign firm is
positive, both ∆Π1(AD
N
k , t) > 0 and ∆Π1(AD
k
23, t) > 0 hold, implying that country 1’s
AD action always increases the operating profit of firm 1. However, the AD action hurts
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the targeted foreign firm’s profit because ∆Πk(AD
N
k , t) < 0 and ∆Πl(AD
k
23, t) < 0 (k, l ∈
{2, 3}, l 6= k) hold. Meanwhile, the profit of the non-targeted foreign firm, ∆Πl(ADk, t),
may decrease if country 1 is the non-member of an RTA. Otherwise, ∆Πl(ADk, t) > 0
holds.
Note that the equilibrium profit of each firm in each country is quadratic in the
producer price in that country and the total profit is additive sum of them. Therefore, if
the mean price is kept constant, each firm’s profit increases as the price difference among
countries increases. From the perspective of firm 2, if countries 2 and 3 form an RTA
and tariffs satisfy t23 = t < t12 = t13 = τ , the producer price of good 2 is initially higher
in country 3 because the RTA between countries 2 and 3 makes the effective market size
of good 2 in country 3 is greater than the effective market size in country 1. Because the
country 1’s AD action against country 3 increases the prices in country 1 and reduces
the prices in country 3, it may decrease the price difference of good 2 between countries
1 and 3 and hurts firm 2. If countries 2 and 3 do not form an RTA and t23 is equal to
or higher than t12 and t13, the AD action always widens the price difference and benefits
firm 2. The same effect applied for firm 3 if country 1’s AD action targets firm 2.
Proposition 4 Country 1’s AD action increases the operating profit of firm 1, while it
decreases the profit of the targeted firm. It may decrease the profit of the non-targeted
firm if countries 2 and 3 form an RTA. It increases the profit of the non-targeted firm
otherwise.
4 Decisions on antidumping
Here, we investigate the decisions of the government of country 1 in Stage 2. The change
in government 1’s payoff from its AD action against one foreign country (country k) is
given by
∆G1(AD
N
k , t) = G1(ADk, t)−G1(N, t)
= γ∆W1(AD
N
k , t) + (1− γ)∆Π1(ADNk , t) (22)
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where ∆Wj(AD
N
k , t) = W1(AD
N
k , t) − W1(N, t) represents the changes in welfare of
country j , gross of the fixed costs of AD actions if J = 1, from the country 1’s
AD action only against country k. Similarly, the change in the government payoff in
country 1 from its AD actions against both foreign firms becomes ∆G1(AD
N
23, t) =
γ∆W1(AD
N
23, t) + (1 − γ)∆Π1(ADN23, t). We can confirm that ∆W1(ADNk , t) < 0 and
∆W1(AD
k
23, t) < 0 always hold, as long as the dumping margin of the targeted firm is
positive. An AD action increases consumer prices in the domestic market and the result-
ing reductions in imports volume reduces consumer surplus and tariff revenues. Therefore,
an AD action always decreases the welfare of country 1. Because ∆Π1(AD
N
k , t) > 0 and
∆Π1(AD
k
23, t) > 0 hold, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2 ∂{∆G1(σ, t)}/(∂γ) < 0 holds (σ ∈ {ADNk , ADk23}), where ∆G1(σ, t) > 0 at
γ = 0 and ∆G1(σ, t) < 0 at γ = 1.
As γ increases, the gains from AD action decrease because the government is more
concerned with the negative effect of AD action on consumer surplus and tariff revenues
than the positive effect on the domestic firm’s profit. This lemma indicates that there
exists the level of γ at which ∆G1(AD
N
k , t) = 0 holds, γ
N
k (t) (< 1). Similarly, let γ
k
23(t)
(< 1) be the level of γ at which ∆G1(AD
k
23, t) = 0 holds.
Suppose firm 1 only requests AD action against firm k. Then, the government of
country 1 accepts it if ∆G1(AD
N
k , t) > F holds and rejects it otherwise. Suppose firm
1 requests AD action against both firms. The government in country 1 accepts them if
∆G1(AD
N
k , t) ≥ ∆G1(ADNl , t) (k 6= l) and min[∆G1(ADNk , t),∆G1(ADk23, t)] > F hold
where ∆G1(AD
k
23, t) = ∆G1(AD
N
23, t)−∆G1(ADNk , t). The government only accepts AD
action against firm k and rejects AD action against another foreign firm if ∆G1(AD
N
k , t) >
F ≥ ∆G1(ADk23, t) holds. If ∆G1(ADNk , t) < F holds for any k, the government rejects
any AD requests.
Firm 1 correctly anticipates which request will be accepted by the government, and
chooses and requests the AD action(s) from acceptable options that maximizes its profit.
Lemma 3 ∆Π1(σ, t) > F always hold whenever ∆G1(σ, t) > F holds (σ ∈ {ADNk , ADk23}).
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This lemma suggests that firm 1 always request an AD action if it anticipates it will be
accepted by the government. In the following subsections, we discuss how the government
1’s AD actions are related to the formation of an RTA.
4.1 No RTA
We start with the case where there are no RTA and, therefore, t12 = t13 = t23 = τ holds
and the tariff vector is tN = (τ , τ , τ). In this case, because foreign countries are sym-
metric in all aspects, we have ∆G1(AD
N
2 , tN) = ∆G1(AD
N
3 , tN) and ∆G1(AD
2
23, tN) =
∆G1(AD
3
23, tN). We can confirm that ∆Π1(AD
N
k , tN) > ∆Π1(AD
k
23, tN) > 0 is satisfied,
implying that an AD action against one foreign country reduces the firm 1’s gains from
an AD action against another foreign country.
Suppose country 1 implements AD action against country 2. The AD action raises
the prices in country 1 and reduces the pries in country 2, while the prices in country
3 remain unchanged. This reduces the dumping margin of good 3, decreasing firm 1’s
gains from AD action against country 3. The decreased dumping margin of good 3 also
reduces the welfare loss of AD action, ∆W1(AD
N
k , tN) < ∆W1(AD
k
23, tN) < 0. Therefore,
by (22), ∂{∆G1(ADNk , tN)}/(∂γ) < ∂{∆G1(ADk23, tN)}/(∂γ) < 0 holds and an increase
in γ decreases the gains from an AD action against a particular firm less if country 1
implements an AD action against another firm. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 5 If there are no RTAs, the equilibrium outcome becomes (i) AD23 if F <
min[∆G1(AD
N
k , tN),∆G1(AD
k
23, tN)] holds, (ii) either AD2 or AD3 if ∆G1(AD
k
23, tN) ≤
F < ∆G1(AD
N
k , tN) holds. Otherwise, the equilibrium outcome becomes N.
Figure 1 shows the possible equilibrium outcome in the (γ,F ) space. In depicting
Figure 1, parameters are set at a = 10, b = 0.75, τ = 6.
[Figure 1 around here]
If the government in country 1 places a sufficiently large weight on firm 1’s profit in its
AD decision, firm 1 requests and the government accepts AD actions against both foreign
firms. If the fixed cost of AD is in the middle range, firm 1 requests an AD only against
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one foreign firm, which is implemented in equilibrium. Since countries are symmetric,
it is undetermined which foreign firm becomes the target. If the fixed cost of AD is
sufficiently high or the government places sufficiently large weight on social surplus, firm
1 does not request any AD action.
4.2 RTA between countries 1 and 2
Here, we elaborate on the effect of an RTA on AD actions against the member and the non-
member countries. Suppose country 1 and 2 forms an RTA and the tariffs between them
is reduced to t12 = t that is smaller than τ , and the tariff vector becomes t12 = (t, τ , τ).
By Proposition 1, the dumping margin under no AD action is smaller for good 2
and greater for good 3, d2(N, t12) < d2(N, tN) = d3(N, tN) < d3(N, t12). This implies
that the price changes from AD action are greater if country 1 implements AD measure
against country 2. From the perspective of firm 1’s profit, a smaller dumping margin of
the rival firm decreases while a larger dumping margin increases its gains from an AD
action. Hence, ∆G1(AD
N
2 , t12) < ∆G1(AD
N
2 , tN) = ∆G1(AD
N
3 , tN) < ∆G1(AD
N
3 , t12)
holds at γ = 0. This implies that the formation of an RTA increases the domestic firm’s
incentive to request an AD measure against the non-member and it decreases its incentive
to request an AD measure against the member.
Lemma 4 The RTA of country 1 and country 2 increases firm 1’s gains from country
1’s AD action against firm 3 and decreases them from country 1’s AD action against firm
2.
From the perspective of consumer surplus and tariff revenues, a greater dumping
margin increases the efficiency loss from implementing an AD measure. Hence,
∂{∆G1(ADN3 , t12)}
∂γ
<
∂{∆G1(ADN3 , tN)}
∂γ
=
∂{∆G1(ADN2 , tN)}
∂γ
<
∂{∆G1(ADN2 , t12)}
∂γ
< 0
(23)
holds. Similarly, ∆G1(AD
3
23, t12) < ∆G1(AD
3
23, tN) = ∆G1(AD
2
23, tN) < ∆G1(AD
2
23, t12)
hold at γ = 0 and ∂{∆G1(AD223, t12)}/(∂γ) < ∂{∆G1(AD323, t12)}/(∂γ) < 0 hold. As
the government cares more about social surplus, the government becomes less eager to
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accept AD requests, and the degree of decrease in the government payoff is larger if AD
targets the non-member firm and smaller if the target is the member firm.
This implies that, in the presence of an RTA between countries 1 and 2, the gov-
ernment of country 1 gains more from its AD action against the non-member country
(country 3) when the government’s weight on social welfare is sufficiently small, and it
gains more from its AD action against the member country (country 2) when it is suffi-
ciently large. The same result applies if country 1 chooses country 3 rather than country
2 as a partner of an RTA. Let γ denote the cut-off level of γ at which ∆G1(AD
N
2 , t12) =
∆G1(AD
N
3 , t12) holds. We have ∆G1(AD
N
2 , t12) < ∆G1(AD
N
3 , t12) for γ ∈ [0, γ) and
∆G1(AD
N
2 , t12) > ∆G1(AD
N
3 , t12) for γ ∈ (γ, 1]. Given that implementing multiple AD
actions is unprofitable of the government of country 1 (i.e., ∆G1(AD
k
23, t12) ≤ F is sat-
isfied), even if γ > γ and ∆G1(AD
N
2 , t12) > ∆G1(AD
N
3 , t12) > F holds, the AD action
against country 3 will be chosen. This is because the AD action against the non-member
country generate larger gains to firm 1, and firm 1 requests an AD action only against
country 3. Because any AD action must be backed up by the domestic firm’s AD requests,
the government of country 1 cannot choose an AD action against country 2 even though
it generates a larger payoff for the government.
As in the non-RTA case, it is ambiguous whether the gains from an AD against country
k, ∆G1(AD
N
k , t12), is larger or smaller than the gains from additional AD against another
country, ∆G1(AD
k
23, t12).
Proposition 6 If country 1 has an RTA with country 2, the equilibrium outcome be-
comes:
(i) AD23 if γ < γ and F < min[∆G1(AD
N
3 , t12), G1(AD
3
23, t12)] hold or if γ ≥ γ
and F < min[∆G1(AD
N
3 , t12), G1(AD
3
23, t12)] hold, (ii) AD3 if ∆G1(AD
3
23, t12) ≤ F <
∆G1(AD
N
3 , t12) holds, (iii) AD2 if γ ≤ γ and max[∆G1(ADN3 , t12),∆G1(AD223, t12)] ≤
F < ∆G1(AD
N
3 , t12) hold, (iv) N otherwise.
Figure 2 shows the possible equilibrium outcomes in the (γ,F ) space. The parameter
values are set at the same level as in Figure 1 and we set t = 4.
[Figure 2 around here]
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With the RTA between countries 1 and 2, a single AD action against the non-member
country, AD3, can be the unique equilibrium outcome when the government 1’s weight
on firm 1’s profit is large and the fixed cost of AD firm 1 must incur, F , is neither so large
nor so small. If γ exceeds γ, however, a single AD action against the member country,
AD2, can also be the unique equilibrium outcome.
Figure 3 combines Figures 1 and 2 and shows that how an RTA between countries 1
and 2 changes the equilibrium outcomes in the (γ,F ) space.
[Figure 3 around here]
If γ is small while F is less small, an RTA increases the likelihood of the member’s
AD action against a nonmember, because the equilibrium outcome changes from no AD
action to a single AD action against the non-member (i.e., from N to AD3), or the
outcome changes from a single AD action against either the member or the nonmember
country, or multiple AD actions against both countries, to a single AD action against the
non-member country (i.e., from AD2 or AD3 to AD3, or AD23 to AD3).
Country 1’s RTA increases the dumping margin of the non-member firm’s product and
increases firm 1’s gains from its AD action against the non-member firm. Therefore, if the
government of country 1 places higher weight on the firm 1’s profit, the RTA enhances
the AD action against the non-member firm. Meanwhile, the RTA decreases the dumping
margin of the member firm, diminishing the government 1’s incentive to implement AD
action against the member firm.
However, the opposite case is also possible. If γ is large, an RTA increases the like-
lihood of country 1’s AD action against the member country, because the equilibrium
outcome changes from multiple AD actions to unilateral AD action by the nonmember
country (i.e., from AD23 to AD2). The increased dumping margin of the non-member
firm increases the welfare loss from the AD action against it, while decreased dumping
margin decreases the welfare loss. Therefore, when the government of country 1 suffi-
ciently cares about social welfare, the RTA promotes the AD against the member and
undermines the AD against the non-member
Interestingly, if γ is in the middle range, an RTA may block the AD actions because
the equilibrium outcome changes from AD2 or AD3 to N. In the middle level for γ,
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the gains from AD actions against both the member and the non-member firm decrease,
although the reason for the decline is the increased efficiency loss for the AD against the
non-member and the decreased profit gains for the AD against the member. We have the
following proposition.
Proposition 7 If the country becomes the member of an RTA, it increases its incentive
to implement AD action against the non-member firm while it decreases its incentive to
implement AD action against the member firm. The RTA may promote the member’s
AD against the member, or it may block any AD action if the government’s weight on
social welfare is large enough.
4.3 RTA between countries 2 and 3
If countries 2 and 3 form an RTA and country 1 becomes the non-member, the prices
in the markets of countries 2 and 3 decrease. Let t23 = (τ , τ , t) denote the tariff vector
of this case. Because the domestic prices of goods 2 and 3 decrease and the dumping
margins of both goods decline, d2(N, t23) = d3(N, t23) < d2(N, tN) = d3(N, tN). These
changes in dumping margins decrease firm 1’s gains from AD actions while it decreases
the efficiency loss.
Therefore, for σ ∈ {ADNk , ADk23}, ∆G1(σ, t23) <∆G1(σ, tN) holds at γ = 0 and
∂{∆G1(σ, tN)}
∂γ
<
∂{∆G1(σ, t23)}
∂γ
< 0 (24)
hold. An RTA between targeted countries discourages AD actions when government
places a large weight on the firm 1’s profit, and promote it when government places a
large weight on social welfare. Figure 4 shows changes in the equilibrium outcomes by
the formation of the RTA between countries 2 and 3 in the (γ,F ) space.
[Figure 4 around here]
If a country becomes the non-member of an RTA, the RTA reduces the likelihood of
its AD action against those countries when γ is small because the equilibrium outcome
changes from AD2 or AD3 to N, or from AD23 to AD2 or AD3. However, the RTA
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increases the likelihood of country 1’s AD actions when γ is large, because the equilibrium
outcome changes from N to AD2 or AD3, or from AD2 or AD3 to AD23.
Proposition 8 If the country becomes the non-member of an RTA, it reduces its incen-
tives to implement AD action when the government’s weight on the firm’s profit is large,
while it raises its incentives when the government weight on social welfare is large enough.
5 Conclusion
In a three-country oligopoly model, this paper analyzed a country’s decisions concerning
AD actions against two foreign countries and the relationship between those decisions
and the countries’ RTAs. An RTA intensifies product-market competition and lowers
product prices in the member countries. This effect widens the dumping margin of the
nonmember firm and narrows the dumping margin of the member firm. If the government
is more concerned with domestic firm profit in its AD decision, the RTA may invoke the
member’s AD action against the nonmember. If the governments attach a sufficiently
high value on social welfare, however, the RTA may promote the AD action against the
member. If the governments’ weight on the domestic firm’s profit is neither high nor low,
an RTA may block the AD actions toward both countries.
These results suggest that RTAs can either promote or prevent AD actions against the
nonmember, and sometimes RTAs promotes AD actions against member countries. If the
RTA promotes AD actions toward nonmembers, it hurts nonmembers more than when
AD actions are absent. If the RTA promotes AD actions toward members, RTA may not
benefit member countries even though trade between member countries are preferentially
liberalized. In any case, policy makers should take into account the effect of RTA on the
imposition of AD measures.
My analysis can be extended in several directions. It will be interesting to analyze
the effects of nondiscriminatory, multilateral trade liberalization and compare them with
the effects of preferential trade liberalization. I have assumed that only a single country
implements AD actions. The assumption helps explore how RTAs affects the domestic
firm’s and the government’s incentives to implement AD actions. Incorporating AD
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actions of other two countries and considering strategic interaction between governments
in AD decisions will provide further insights on this issue.8
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